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Abstract
Does gender play a role in the context of team work? Our results based on a
real-e¤ort experiment suggest that performance depends on the composition of the
team. We nd that female and male performance di¤er most in mixed teams with
revenue sharing between the team members, as men put in signicantly more e¤ort
than women. The data also indicate that women perform best when competing in
pure female teams against male teams whereas men perform best when women are
present or in a competitive environment.
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1 Introduction
When setting up team work in a rm, the question arises of how to group workers into
teams. Should they be of the same ability, gender, temperament or should they di¤er in
some or all of these characteristics?
In this paper we report on a real-e¤ort experiment to investigate the relevance of gender
for the optimal composition of a team. In order to address this question, we study
the performance of mixed teams versus teams consisting of men or women only. We
hypothesize that the gender of team members matters for team performance because
social relations are important in team work. For example, a persons e¤ort choice can be
a¤ected by the relationship to those with whom he or she shares the returns from this
e¤ort. Also, free-riding incentives can be signicantly reduced by peer pressure, altruism,
or loyalty among group members.1 Moreover, social norms and gender stereotypes may
inuence the behavior of men and women in teams.
We also design our experiments to establish whether the composition of a team a¤ects
performance under di¤erent incentive schemes di¤erently. Apart from simple team pay
we study competition between teams where the team with the highest performance wins
a bonus. We investigate whether men and women react di¤erently to monetary incentives
and how interactions between men and women a¤ect their performance under the two
di¤erent incentive contracts. For the experiment, teams consisting only of men, teams
consisting only of women and mixed teams consisting of men and women are formed. In
one treatment, male teams compete with male teams, in another treatment female teams
compete with female teams, in a third treatment male and female teams compete with
each other, and in a fourth treatment we introduce competition between mixed teams.
Thereby, we are able to evaluate whether the gender composition of ones own and the
competing team matters.
1The role of social pressure in team work is discussed by Kandel and Lazear (1992) and Huck, Kübler,
and Weibull (2004). For loyalty and altruism in a model of team production see Ferreira (2002).
2
Our main results suggest that performance does not exclusively depend on the chosen
incentive scheme (team pay versus team competition), but rather on the gender of the
group members in conjunction with the chosen incentive scheme. Men exert higher e¤ort
when paired with women or in a competitive environment than when they are among
themselves. Women perform best in pure female teams when competing against male
teams and perform worst under revenue sharing in mixed teams.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section we give a brief
overview of the relevant literature. In Section 3 the design and experimental procedures
are introduced. In Section 4 we present and analyze the results of our study and relate
them to previous ndings from other studies in more detail. Section 5 concludes.
2 Review of the literature
The optimal composition of teams has only recently been studied by economists. Ferreira
(2002) develops a model of team composition when the principal can choose both the
incentive contract and the degree of diversity among teammembers. His theory is tested in
a companion paper (Adams and Ferreira, 2003), using the gender composition of corporate
boards. It is observed that the more heterogeneous a board (i.e. when women are present),
the more high-powered the incentives. This is consistent with homogeneity or loyalty being
complementary to monetary incentives. Hehenkamp and Karbøe (2004) analyze optimal
incentive contracts of a team that is heterogeneous with respect to ability, in the presence
of peer pressure. They show that the principal provides agents of low productivity with
stronger incentives than agents of high productivity. This is due to the fact that peer
pressure (arising from unequal e¤ort levels) is costly for the principal.
Both eld and laboratory experiments have been used to demonstrate that competition
can increase the output of a team signicantly. Nalbantian and Schotter (1997) compare
team competition to team work in an experiment where e¤ort choice creates a monetary
cost. Erev et al. (1993), and van Dijk et al. (2001) use real e¤ort experiments, the
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former to study team competition, the latter to study team work compared to individual
incentive schemes. However, none of the papers deals with issues of gender and optimal
team composition.
The experimental literature on gender e¤ects is extensive. The main insights for gen-
der di¤erences have been gained by testing subjects behavior in public good, prisoners
dilemma, ultimatum and dictator games. One important aspect of such experiments is
whether participants are aware of the gender of the other player(s). Nowell and Tinkler
(1994) conclude from previous studies that "gender di¤erences would seem to be more
forcefully expressed in environments in which the gender of the other subjects is known".2
In our experiments, participants can observe the gender of other participants, and we will
therefore focus on experimental studies of this type.3
In Nowell and Tinklers (1994) study of public good games, all-female groups are slightly
more cooperative than all-male groups and mixed groups. Ortmann and Tichy (1999)
observe in their study of the prisoners dilemma game that in mixed-sex settings, women
cooperate signicantly more often than men in the rst round.4 However, this di¤erence
2This is based on the results in Rapoport and Chammah (1965) and Mason et al. (1991). Both
experiments study prisoners dilemma situations, but only the former with known rivals (nding that
women are less cooperative than men in single-sex situations) while in Mason et al. gender is not known
and no gender di¤erences can be observed. Also, Wiley (1973) nds that in a mixed-sex prisoners dilemma
situation without gender identication, there is no signicant di¤erence between the three possible gender
combinations whereas with verbal communication (and thus gender identication) cooperation rates are
signicantly higher in mixed-sex than in single-sex settings.
3For example, in the work by Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) and Eckel and Grossman (1998) subjects
did not know the gender of their opponents. A number of papers, e.g. Cadsby and Maynes (1998), are
hard to classify, because it is not mentioned whether participants were able to observe the gender of
others.
4Subjects know the gender of the other player only in the single-sex treatments, not in the mixed-sex
treatments, where they only know that they are either paired with a man or with a woman. This is
analogous to our design, as described in the next section.
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decreases after a number of rounds. For single-sex games, there is no signicant gender
di¤erence, and the di¤erence between male and female behavior in mixed-sex environ-
ments disappears if one controls for past experience. Andreoni and Petrie (2004) study
beauty and gender in a repeated public goods game where subjects are identied with
the help of photographs. In their experiment, women make more money than men when
no information about previous contributions is provided. However, if this information
is included, men contribute more and also induce others to make higher contributions,
which leads to higher payo¤s for men than for women.
Gender e¤ects in ultimatum games have been studied by Eckel and Grossman (2001)
whereas Dufwenberg and Muren (forthcoming) ran experiments with dictator games. In
both studies, players were aware of the gender of the other player, and it emerges that
behavior is inuenced by this information. Eckel and Grossman (2001) nd that o¤ers of
women are more generous than those of men, that o¤ers of women do not depend on the
partners gender, and that they are more likely to be accepted. Dufwenberg and Muren
(2002) observe that women are treated more nicely than men in the dictator game.
Finally, Gneezy et al. (2003) as well as Niederle and Vesterlund (2005) study the inter-
action of gender and competition, but their experiments are based on individual com-
pensation, not on team work. Gneezy et al. (2003) nd that men react positively to
tournament-style incentives while women increase their performance only when they com-
pete with women. In Niederle and Vesterlund (2005) there is no di¤erence between the
performance of men and women in a competitive environment, but when given the choice,
women prefer not to compete.
A great number of psychological studies have been conducted to evaluate gender di¤er-
ences in helping behavior, cooperation, competitiveness as well as in performing memory
tasks. A number of these studies will be discussed below. We will relate the results of
our study to the ndings of the economics and the psychology literature in greater detail
in Section 4.
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3 Experimental design and procedure
In order to test for gender and incentive e¤ects in an appropriate environment, participants
worked on a real task. They had to solve as many memory games as possible within 15
minutes.5 We used memory games posted on the web, consisting of ten pairs of cards.
At the start of the game, 20 cards with their faces down are shown. Two cards have to
be clicked on. Then a "Check It"-button has to be pressed, and if the cards match, they
are automatically removed. Otherwise, a "Pick again"-button has to be pressed and two
more cards can be selected. The game ends when all pairs have been matched.6
In the experiment, when a participant had solved a game completely, he or she raised her
hand, we recorded the solved game on the personal record sheet and opened a new game
for this participant. The website o¤ers 10 di¤erent games (with pictures of dinosaurs,
colors, bugs, animals, musical instruments, etc.). In order to prevent confusion from
recalling games played previously, we opened a new game with di¤erent cards every time.
In all sessions, we started with the same game (dinosaurs) and used the same order of
games.
Each team consists of two members. We varied the composition of teams with respect
to gender. In addition, two di¤erent incentive schemes were used, revenue sharing and
team competition. Payo¤s in the revenue sharing treatments (RS) were computed by
adding the number of solved games of the two team members (called "points" in the
instructions), dividing the sum by two and paying out the resulting number in Euros
5We chose the memory game for a number of reasons. First, a more realistic setting might import
interpretations and perceptions which are neither controlled nor relevant considering the specic question
explored. Also, solving memory games captures some key elements of real work  it is an absorbing
and demanding task that requires full concentration. Furthermore, output is exactly measurable. And
comparisons with previous experimental studies are possible which have already provided a number of
stylized facts concerning gender specic behavior in memory tasks.
6The website can be found at http://www.funbrain.com/match/.
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to each team member. In the team competition treatments (TC), the number of solved
games by both team members was computed. Then, the number of solved games of a
team was compared to the number of solved games by a randomly selected second team.
The team that had solved more games received a bonus of 4 points (=Euros), and for the
losing team we subtracted 4 points from the number of games solved jointly. Each team
member then received points equal to the number of games solved in the team plus or
minus the bonus, divided by two. If both teams had solved the same number of games,
no points were subtracted or added.
Treatment Composition of Teams # Sessions # Observations
Revenue Sharing (RS) Single-Sex Teams: Male 2 24
Female 2 24
Mixed Teams 2 24
Team Competition (TC) Single-Sex Teams: Male 1 12
Female 1 12
Female Teams vs. Male Teams 2 24
Mixed Teams 2 24
All 12 144
Table 1: Experimental Treatments
Altogether, we ran seven di¤erent treatments: pure male teams with revenue sharing; pure
female teams with revenue sharing; mixed teams (one man and one woman) with revenue
sharing; competition between pure male teams; competition between pure female teams;
competition of female against male teams; and competition between mixed teams. Table
1 summarizes the treatments. Each session had 12 participants. Overall, we collected 144
independent observations from 144 participants.
The participants in each session were seated in two groups of six persons at opposing walls
of the computer lab. When participants entered the lab, the chairs were positioned such
that the two groups faced each other. Only after the participants had read the instructions
we told them to turn around and face the computer in the corresponding booth. This
ensured that all participants had enough time to notice the gender composition on both
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sides of the room. In the instructions,7 participants were informed that they had been
randomly matched with a person sitting at the same side of the room. These two partic-
ipants formed a team. In the sessions with teams consisting only of men or women, we
made sure that only male or female participants were seated on either side of the room.8
Thus, the information that they were randomly paired with a participant from their side
of the room implied that it was a person of their own gender. But we never explicitly
mentioned gender in order to test for the relevance of gender without directly pointing
out this aspect of the situation to the participants. In the treatment with mixed teams,
three men and three women were seated on each side of the room. Thus, participants
knew that they might be paired either with a man or a woman.
In the treatments with team competition, we additionally informed participants that
the competing team consists of persons placed at the opposite side of the room. For
competition between men or women only, we invited either only men or only women to
the experiment. For competition between male and female teams, we invited six men
and six women and placed them at opposite sides of the room. For competition between
mixed teams, we again invited six men and six women, but placed them at both sides of
the room, i.e. three men and three women were seated on each side of the room. Thus,
participants could see each other and they could gure out the gender composition of
both, ones own and the competing team.
At the end of the experiment all participants were informed about the number of games
solved by their team and, in the team competition treatments, whether their team received
a bonus of 4 points, no bonus or whether their team payo¤ was decreased by 4 points.
There was a show-up fee of 3 Euros. Average earnings in the experiment which lasted
about 40 minutes were 8.14 Euros (including the show-up fee).
7See the Appendix for a translated version of the instructions. The original instructions (in German)
are available upon request from the authors.
8In all treatments where men and women were present, we ensured the correct distribution of men
and women in the room by handing out seat numbers for the computer terminals to the participants
when they entered the room. Subjects picked these numbers themselves from a stack of cards, but we
manipulated from which stack they drew a card. This went unnoticed by the participants.
8
4 Results
The results are organized around three research questions: (1) Do di¤erent payo¤ schemes
for team work a¤ect the performance of men and women? (2) Are there gender di¤erences
in performance under di¤erent payo¤ schemes? (3) Do male and female performance
depend on the composition of the team? We will answer these questions by performing
statistical tests on the experimental data. For the tests, the dependent variable is the
number of games solved by a participant. Since our independent variables, gender and
incentive contract, can each take only one of two values, the statistical analysis of the
data is performed on the basis of the two-sample t-test (henceforth: t-test) as well as the
non-parametric Mann-Whitney U -test (henceforth: MWU-test).
4.1 Performance of men and women under di¤erent payo¤schemes
First we compare overall performance under the two payo¤schemes (RS and TC). Accord-
ing to Table 2 the average result in the TC treatments (5.32) is slightly higher than the
average in the RS treatments (5.03). This is also true for each subgroup. Men as well as
women solve on average more memory games in the TC than in the RS treatment (men:
5.67 vs. 5.33; women: 4.97 vs. 4.72). However, these di¤erences are not signicant:9
Thus, the chosen payment scheme does not signicantly inuence the average individual
performance. But the switch from revenue sharing to team competition increases the vari-
ance of outcomes (see Figure 1). The null hypothesis of no di¤erences in variance between
both treatments is rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis of a higher variation in
the TC treatment at the 5% level (Variance Ratio F-test, p = 0:0355):10
9We nd that p > 0:15 for each subgroup (males, females) as well as for the pooled data, regardless
of the statistical test used.
10The statistical signicance of this result on subgroup level is maintained only for the male subgroup.
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Revenue Sharing (RS) Team Competition (TC)
Mean Min. Max. Std. Dev. Mean Min. Max. Std. Dev.
Men 5.33 3 7 0.956 5.67 3 9 1.454
Women 4.72 2 7 1.210 4.97 2 7 1.383
All 5.03 2 7 1.126 5.32 2 9 1.452
Table 2: Descriptive statistics: Number of Solved Games
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Figure 1: Mean-variance scatterplot of male and female performance. We distinguish
between team members being of the same sex (TM_SS), of the opposite sex (TM_OS)
and the members of the other team being of the same sex (OT_SS) or of the opposite
sex (OT_OS). E.g., RS_TM_SS summarizes the data from the revenue sharing
treatment where the team member was of the same sex; empty dots stand for women,
full dots for men.
Observation 1: The choice of payo¤scheme (revenue sharing vs. team competition) does
not signicantly inuence individual performance. However, competition signicantly
increases the variance of the observed outcomes.
The incentive scheme alone has no clear-cut e¤ect on performance. This allows us to focus
on gender e¤ects and in particular on the interaction of gender with the chosen incentive
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scheme. Of course, the sensitivity of performance to incentives depends on the chosen
task. For our purpose of investigating gender e¤ects we have succeeded in identifying a
task in which performance is not very sensitive to monetary incentives alone, but possibly
to the incentive scheme in conjunction with gender (as will be shown below).
A number of studies nd a positive e¤ect of competition on performance, see, e.g., Nal-
bantian and Schotter (1997), van Dijk et al. (2001), Gneezy et al. (2003), and Erev et al.
(1993). However, each of these studies di¤ers from ours in several respects. In van Dijk
et al. (2001) and Gneezy et al. (2003), for example, single individuals compete instead
of teams as in our case. Nalbantian and Schotter (1997) do not use a real e¤ort task
but have participants pick a number for their e¤ort choice, where higher numbers are
associated with a higher monetary cost. Erev et al. (1993) consider team competition in
a real e¤ort environment as we do, but participants were able to observe the performance
of the competing team as well as of the other members of their own team constantly
during the experiment. Thus, they had the possibility to increase e¤ort in response to
the performance of others, which might enhance the e¤ectiveness of competition. In ad-
dition, Nalbantian and Schotter (1997) and Erev et al. (1993) split the teams (consisting
of six respectively four participants) who rst work together under revenue sharing into
two competing teams. Thus, by introducing competition between teams the team size is
decreased, leaving it open whether the increase in performance can be ascribed to com-
petitive pressure or to smaller team size. Also, they did not control for the composition
of teams in terms of gender as a possible determinant of performance.
The outcomes of team competition show a greater variance than the outcomes of revenue
sharing, which is in line with the ndings of Nalbantian and Schotter (2003) as well as
van Dijk et al. (2001). In a competitive environment, the optimal strategy depends on
the ability of ones competitors. Thus, di¤erent beliefs might lead to di¤erent optimal
strategies in the case of competition, which explains the increased variance in the number
of solved games compared to revenue sharing.
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The increased variance of payo¤s under team competition could a¤ect the performance
of men and women di¤erently, given the di¤erent degrees of risk aversion of men and
women (as evidenced in the psychology literature (Byrnes, Miller and Schafer, 1999) and
in the economics literature (Eckel and Grossman, forthcoming)). However, as stated in
Observation 1, men and women do not react in a signicantly di¤erent way to competition
and thus to the higher variance in payo¤s. This nding is consistent with the result of
Gneezy et al. (2003) who do not nd any evidence that risk aversion inuences male and
female performance in the context of tournaments.
4.2 Does gender inuence performance?
If men and women are equally skillful and incentives are the same for both groups, the
average number of games solved should not be signicantly di¤erent. However, the ob-
served outcomes reveal a strong gender e¤ect on performance (see Table 2), indicating
that men solved signicantly more games than women.11 In addition, this result holds for
both payo¤ schemes and is statistically signicant (t-test, RS: p = 0:02; TC: p = 0:042).12
Observation 2: Men perform signicantly better than women.
Di¤erences in performance between women and men depend on the specic task.13 Our
memory task reveals a clear asymmetry in that men solve on average more games than
women. This allows us to study team work in the presence of team members with di¤erent
abilities.
11MWU-test: p = 0:003; t-test: p = 0:002:
12The corresponding p-values for the MWU-test are: p = 0:015 for RS and p = 0:063 for TC, revealing
only a weakly signicant di¤erence for the team competition treatment.
13For example, in Gneezy et al. (2003) where subjects had to solve mazes, men also performed better
than women. In Niederle and Vesterlund (2005) no gender di¤erence can be found for the task of adding
numbers.
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Although the memory game itself is not the main focus of this paper, it is interesting
to compare our results to other studies based on this game. Several experiments by
psychologists show that women outperformmen in the memory game (see, e.g., Tottenham
et al., 2003, McBurney et al., 1997). However, no monetary incentives were used in the
psychology experiments, and performance in these studies was measured in other ways
than in our experiment.14 The di¤erence to our ndings can be due to the interaction
of gender with other features of the situation such as monetary incentives. E.g., women
might be overall less motivated than men in a situation where they get paid according to
performance. While our data are not su¢ cient to fully explain the observed di¤erence,
we will address the relationship between incentives and gender in the next section.
4.3 Gender e¤ects with revenue sharing
A number of factors can a¤ect behavior of men and women depending on whether they face
a team member of the same or of the opposite sex. With revenue sharing and assuming
that the utility of participants is linear in money, the expected number of games solved
by the other team member should not a¤ect performance. Thus, even if men or women
believe that the other gender di¤ers in ability, this should not a¤ect choices. But when
working together in a team, motives such as solidarity, courtesy, competitiveness, or
indi¤erence towards the same or the opposite gender can come into play. Also, social
norms regarding helping behavior between men and women might change a subjects
motivation to contribute when participating in a mixed team compared to a single-sex
male or female team.
As shown in Figure 2 for revenue sharing (RS), there are no signicant di¤erences between
male and female performance within single-sex teams (5.17 vs. 4.79). However, in mixed
14Only one game is solved and performance refers either to the "e¢ ciency measure" dened as the
total number of trials divided by total time (Tottenham et al., 2003) or to the "memory score" dened
as the total number of times any card was turned over (McBurney et al., 1997).
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teams men solve on average 5.67 games, as compared to 4.58 for women (t-test, p =
0:037).15 The considerable di¤erence between e¤ort of men and women in mixed teams is
due to the strong increase of male performance relative to single-sex male teams (MWU,
p = 0:052; one-tailed). Men increase their e¤ort by 10% when paired with a woman
instead of a man. Women not only fail to increase their e¤ort when paired with men, but
the number of solved games slightly decreases on average (4.79 vs. 4.58 in favor of purely
female teams).
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Figure 2: Average performance of men and women in all treatments (standard
deviations in parantheses)
This leads to:
Observation 3: With revenue sharing (RS), the performance of men and women does
not signicantly di¤er in the case of single-sex teams. However, in mixed teams men
perform signicantly better than women.
The behavior of men and women is consistent with the gender stereotypes that men
should support women and women need to be helped. When paired together in a team,
men adopt the active role while women are more passive than in situations where only
15The corresponding value for the MWU-test is p = 0:033:
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women are present. This nding is in line with psychological experiments on helping
behavior. They demonstrate that women are overall more likely to receive help than men.
Furthermore, men display chivalry and helping behavior towards strangers (comparable
to our experimental setting with anonymity) while women typically care for friends and
intimate relations.16
As mentioned in the brief review of the literature, Eckel and Grossman (2001) nd that
men are chivalrous when playing ultimatum games in that they are more likely to accept
o¤ers from women. Dufwenberg and Muren (forthcoming) observe that women receive
higher donations than men in dictator games, and in the experiment by Andreoni and
Petrie (2004) women earn more in public good games. These observations are similar to
our nding that men behave nicely towards women when working together in a team.
Eckel and Grossman (2001) also nd that in ultimatum games, women almost never reject
o¤ers made by women, which they call solidarity. Solidarity or loyalty among women can
explain our nding that women exert higher e¤ort when the benets are shared with
another woman rather than with a man. Finally, the study of Wiley (1973) on prisoners
dilemma games shows that men cooperate signicantly more often when paired with a
woman than when paired with a man.
To sum up, our results reveal a signicant gender di¤erence in performance in mixed
teams which is not present in single-sex teams. This di¤erence in behavior in mixed
teams is consistent both with the results from other experiments and with common gender
stereotypes.
4.4 Gender e¤ects with team competition
Economic theory predicts that own ability and the ability of ones opponents in a tourna-
ment a¤ect the optimal e¤ort choice. Thus, men who think (correctly) that they are on
average better in solving memory games than women might be tempted to reduce their
16For an overview and a meta-analysis of this literature see Eagly and Crowley (1986).
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contribution when competing against a female team. Also female (less able) teams may
lower their e¤ort when competing against male teams, suspecting that their team will
lose anyway. A similar e¤ect could be generated by the stereotype that women perform
poorly in a competitive environment. On the other hand, solidarity among women might
increase womens performance when competing against men.
In the data, competition among single-sex teams leads to a gender gap in mean perfor-
mance when the competing teams are of the same sex (5.67 vs. 4.67 in favor of the men),
but this di¤erence is not signicant (p > 0:10 regardless of the statistical test used).
Furthermore, as shown in Figure 2 the gender gap almost disappears when male and
female teams compete against each other (the average number of solved games is 5.67
and 5.25, respectively). There is a noticeable although statistically insignicant rise in
womens average performance from 4.67 (competition of female against female teams) to
5.25 (competition of female against male teams). Furthermore, as shown in Figure 2, the
performance of men in team competition does not signicantly depend on the composition
of both, the own and the competing team. The performance of women in team compe-
tition with mixed teams is inbetween the performance of single-sex teams and male vs.
female teams.17 This result is in line with our previous ndings of lower performance of
women in mixed teams and higher performance of women when competing against men.
Observation 4: With team competition (TC), the composition of the team has no
signicant e¤ect on the performance of men and women. There is a tendency for women
to increase their e¤ort when competing in pure female teams against pure male teams.
The prediction that all teams will lower their performance when male and female teams
compete is not supported by the data. Rather, we observe that women perform best when
competing against men, which is consistent with the hypothesis that there is a certain
17There is no signicant di¤erence between mean performance of men and women when they compete
in mixed teams (p > 0:3 in both statistical tests).
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degree of solidarity among women. Gneezy et al. (2003) nd for incentive schemes based
on individual performance that women perform better when competing against women
than against men. However, a number of studies by psychologists based on game-playing
by children show that girls are more competitive when playing against boys than against
girls, see Moely et al. (1979) and the studies cited therein as well as Conti et al. (2001).
Erev et al. (1993) observe (for mixed teams) that the performance enhancing e¤ect of
competition diminishes as the di¤erence in ability between the competing groups increase.
This is consistent with the predictions of the theory. In our experiment, the performance
of the more able single-sex male teams is independent of the gender of the competing team,
and women even increase their performance slightly when competing against men. Thus,
the (negative) incentive e¤ect due to di¤erences in ability might be overcompensated by
gender e¤ects in our experiment.
5 Conclusions
This paper reports on an experiment about group incentives and productivity, focusing on
the relevance of gender for the optimal composition of a team. We set up an environment
in which we can measure the e¤ects of changes in the gender composition and the incentive
scheme on performance. For this purpose we conduct an experiment in which participants
have to solve a real task.
The results of the experiment suggest that gender plays a role in the context of team work
and is an important aspect for the optimal composition of teams. In particular, we nd
that performance does not simply depend on the chosen incentive scheme, but rather on
the gender of the group members in conjunction with the chosen incentive scheme. For
example, the performance of women can be increased by 15% when moving from revenue
sharing in mixed teams to team competition between single-sex male and female teams.
The data also show that, holding the incentive scheme xed, the gender composition of
the team matters for team work (RS), but not for team competition (TC), especially
17
for men. This can be due to the fact that by introducing a tournament among teams,
the focus of attention is shifted from the gender aspect of the situation to the aspect of
competition.
Which incentive scheme and which gender composition of team members maximize the
performance of a team? Men perform worst when the benets are shared with another
man in a cooperative environment. Either the presence of women or competition or
both lead to a signicant increase in male performance.18 The case is quite di¤erent for
women. They tend to reduce their e¤ort when paired with men in case of team pay,
and perform best when competing against men.19 Therefore, our experiment yields a
number of suggestions for the organization of work in a situation with team work and a
task that exibits similar features as the chosen memory game. If the work force consists
only of men, it would be best to introduce competition among teams. Alternatively,
hiring women in such a situation increases the performance of men, but may decrease
overall performance due to the weak performance of women in mixed teams with revenue
sharing. If the workforce consists only of women, it does not matter whether they are paid
according to revenue sharing or to team competition. Finally, if both men and women are
employed, the highest performance can be achieved by forming male and female teams
and by introducing competition between them. Of course, more evidence is needed to
evaluate to what extent these ndings can be generalized, for example to other tasks and
to larger teams.
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Appendix: Instructions
[translated from German - for revenue sharing (RS)]
Welcome to the experiment! Please read the instructions carefully. If you dont under-
stand something, please raise your hand. We will come to you and answer your question
individually. The instructions are the same for all participants.
At the beginning of the experiment you will be randomly matched with a person from
the same side of the room. Of course your anonymity will be guaranteed throughout
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the whole experiment. This means that the other participants wont get to know your
true identity. The same holds for all participants.
Your task is to solve as many memory games as possible within 15 minutes. As soon as
you have solved a game successfully, please announce this by raising your hand. We will
then come to you, update your score and start a new game.
Your payo¤ is determined as follows:
The number of memory games that you solved will be added to the number of solved
memory games by the other participant of your group. Each nished game yields one
point (= 1 Euro). Each member of the group gets paid half of the joint score.
Example: You have solved X1 and the other member of your group has solved X2 memory-
games. Then each of you will be paid 1
2
(X1+X2).
At the end of the experiment you are informed about the number of memory games solved
by you and by the other member of your group and about your payo¤.
At the beginning you will receive an initial endowment of 3 Euros.
If you dont understand something, please raise your hand. We will come to you and
answer your question individually.
[translated from German for team competition (TC)]
Welcome to the experiment! Please read the instructions carefully. If you dont under-
stand something, please raise your hand. We will come to you and answer your question
individually. The instructions are the same for all participants.
At the beginning of the experiment you will be matched with a person from the same
side of the room. Of course, anonymity will be guaranteed throughout the whole
experiment. This means that the other participants wont get to know your true identity.
The same holds for all participants.
Your task is to solve as many memory games as possible within 15 minutes. As soon as
you have solved a game successfully, please announce this by raising your hand. We will
then come to you, update your score and start a new game.
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Your payo¤ is determined as follows:
The number of memory games that you solved will be added to the number of solved
memory games by the other participant of your group. Each solved game yields one point
(= 1 Euro). To determine your payo¤ the joint score of your group will be compared
with the score of another group that consists of persons placed at the opposite side
of the room and is randomly matched with your group. In the case that the score of
your group is higher, your group will receive a premium of 4 points and the other group
will get subtracted 4 points. In the case your groups score is lower than the one of your
opponents, your group will get subtracted 4 points while the other one will receive 4
points as a premium. If the scores are the same, neither a premium is paid nor are points
subtracted. In any case the payo¤ of each member of your group amounts to half of the
nal score of the group.
Put di¤erently, the payo¤s are computed in the following way:
You have X1 and the other member of your group has solved X2 memory games. In
the other randomly selected group one player has solved Y1 and the other has solved Y2
games.
 If X1+X2 > Y1+Y2 holds, your group will receive a premium of 4 points and the
payo¤ of each group member is (X1+X2+4)/2.
 If X1+X2 < Y1+Y2 holds, your group will get subtracted 4 points. Therefore each
group member receives a payo¤ equal to (X1+X2-4)/2.
 If X1+X2=Y1+Y2 holds, neither a premium is paid nor will points be subtracted.
The payo¤ of each group member is (X1+X2)/2.
At the end of the experiment you will be informed about how many memory games you
and the other participant of your group have solved, and whether you received a premium
or whether points were subtracted, as well as your nal payo¤.
At the beginning you will receive an initial endowment of 3 Euros. In the case of losses,
these will be subtracted from your initial endowment.
If you dont understand something, please raise your hand. We will come to you and
answer your question individually.
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